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This paper studies whether changes in the exchange rate a¤ect a countrys export
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rm resource
reallocation rather than the inter-region or intra-rm resource reallocation.
Keywords: exchange rate, export-oriented development strategy, export structure,
regression discontinuity design, di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation, Chinas exchange-
rate reform, resource reallocation
JEL Classication Codes: F31; F14; D22
School of Economics, Singapore Management University. E-mail: wentaihsu@smu.edu.sg
yDepartment of Economics, National University of Singapore. E-mail: justinly6@gmail.com
zDepartment of Economics, National University of Singapore. E-mail: a0059199@nus.edu.sg
xWe thank the seminar participants at the 2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society and Singapore
Management University for their helpful comments. All errors are ours.
1
1 Introduction
Exchange rates have been an important tool of trade policies and development strategies.
In particular, a weaker currency is widely believed by politicians and government o¢ cials
to stie import competition, helping to relieve domestic political pressures from high un-
employment rates and boosting the performance of export sectors, subsequently leading to
economic growth. By this rationale, many developing countries purposely undervalue their
currencies by a xed-exchange-rate regime or constant interventions to pursue a long-run
export-led growth strategy.1
However, is currency appreciation all that bad for a developing countrys economic
growth? A recent study by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) argue that when a coun-
trys export structure becomes similar to that of developed countries, the ensuing economic
growth of the country would be higher. Similar empirical ndings are uncovered by Jarreau
and Poncet (2012) in the context of China. The rationale is based on a cost discovery
story or more generally, the idea of countries become what they produce. As rms and
industries respond to exchange-rate movement di¤erently, if currency appreciation induces
change in export structure toward that of developed countries, then such appreciation may
be conducive for economic development in some ways.2
This paper provides a simple theory explaining an intuitive channel of how export struc-
ture is a¤ected by exchange rates and carries out empirical tests of whether and how the
export structure is a¤ected by currency appreciation. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no work on how the exchange rate changes a countrys export structure (i.e., the distri-
bution of export values across di¤erent industries), despite numerous studies on the e¤ect
of the exchange rate on aggregate export values and individual rm behaviors (e.g., Amiti,
Itskhoki, and Konings, 2014; Berman, Martin, and Mayer, 2012; Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro,
and Vichyanond, 2013; Dekle, Jeong, and Ryoo, 2010; Li, Ma, and Xu, 2013).
Our empirical tests use a sudden and unexpected currency revaluation in China to ex-
amine whether and how the exchange rate a¤ects export structure. On July 21, 2005, the
Chinese government unexpectedly revalued its currency against the U.S. dollar, which re-
sulted in an immediate appreciation of 2:1 percent (for a detailed description on this episode
and the unexpectedness, see Section 3). The sharp change in Chinas exchange rate pro-
vides us an opportunity to have an arguably clean identication of the e¤ect of currency
1In the case of China, reliable estimates show that Chinese currency was undervalued by around 40% as
of 2000 (Frankel 2006) and around 25% as of 2005 (Rodrik 2010). Rodrik (2008) explains this rationale by
showing the clear positive associations between undervalued currencies, large exports, and rapid growth in
developing countries.
2Such discussion focuses on economic growth via a production point of view. But, of course consumers
in the developing countries would benet from their currency appreciation for cheaper consumption goods.
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appreciation using a regression discontinuity (RD) estimation. Specically, the exogeneity
of currency appreciation makes export structure before currency appreciation (i.e., January
2005-July 2005) a good counterfactual to the one after currency appreciation (i.e., August
2005-December 2005). Meanwhile, to purge the monthly e¤ect (e.g., di¤erences in U.S. de-
mand across months), we add data of a year during which Chinese currency was xed against
the U.S. dollar, as a control group, and conduct a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DD) estimation.
In our empirical investigation, we use an index developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Ro-
drik (2007) which measures how relatively heavily a good is exported by developed countries.
In particular, we use this index to construct an export similarity index that measures how
similar Chinas exports are to developed countries (see details in Section 3). Our RD-DD
estimation results show that after the currency appreciation, Chinas export structure to
the U.S. becomes more similar to that of developed countries.3 These results remain robust
to a battery of sensitivity checks, including a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DDD)
estimation, a placebo test, an examination of U.S. exports to China, and an exclusion of
processing trade.
To illustrate how the exchange rate changes export structure, we present a trade model
with monopolistic competition in which two sectors of di¤erentiated goods di¤er mainly in
their elasticities of substitution. As the Chinese currency is heavily controlled and under-
valued, we take the fact of an undervalued Souths currency as the key feature dening the
North-South structure. As explained in Section 2.4, there is strong evidence that devel-
oped countries export relatively heavily in goods with low elasticity of substitution (high
markups). Given that the North exports relatively heavily in goods with high markups, we
show that if the Souths currency appreciates, the Souths export structure becomes closer to
the Norths. The intuition is that when the Souths exports become more expensive due to
currency appreciation, the reductions in the Norths expenditure on these goods are larger in
the sector with higher price elasticity. Whereas this argument based on the intensive margin
with entry xed in the short run ts our empirical results, the same theoretical result holds
in the long run when free entry is allowed.
In addition to above-mentioned story of countries become what they produce, changes
in export structure may have other important long-run implications, especially with the re-
source reallocation and learning-by-doing e¤ects, Chinese producers may gradually become
more productive and provide ercer competition in these, so to speak, high-end sectors.
Another direct implication of our empirical results is that since developed countries (or the
3We focus on Chinas exports to the U.S. as Chinas sudden exchange-rate change is against the U.S.
dollar. We do not examine Chinas exports to the world because the weighted average of exchange rates
against various countries was quite volatile in 2005, as well as in other years.
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U.S.) concentrate on and export relatively more of those goods with low elasticity of substi-
tution, the competition in these goods from China is reduced by the currency appreciation,
but not by much. That is, from both developed and developing countriesviewpoints, the
adjustments of export structure mitigate the shocks.
While the model displays a mechanism of resource reallocation across rms within a
locality, our empirical estimates capture the whole spectrum of resource reallocation. That
is, our estimates captures three margins of the changes in export structure: across cities,
within city and across rms, and within rm and across products. Meanwhile, by further
exploring the data, we can decompose the appreciation e¤ect on export structure into these
three margins. We nd that resource reallocation within city and across rms accounts for
the majority of our appreciation e¤ect (i.e., 72:22 percent), while resource reallocation across
cities as well as within rm and across products explain 16:67 percent and 11:11 percent,
respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theory of how export structure is
a¤ected by the exchange rate. Section 3 describes our data, variables, and empirical strategy,
including details of the reform of Chinas exchange-rate regime in July 2005. Empirical
results including robustness checks are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Exchange Rate and Export Structure
We extend a standard monopolistic competition model of trade à la Krugman (1980) and
Helpman and Krugman (1985) to provide a plausible mechanism regarding how export struc-
ture is a¤ected by the exchange rate.
2.1 Model Setup
There are two countries, North and South, with population Ln and Ls, respectively. Here,
we think of China as the South, who sets up a xed-exchange-rate regime, and therefore
the exchange rate between two countries is a policy (exogenous) variable. There are three
goods/industries in the economy, and the utility of a representative agent in country j follows
a Cobb-Douglas form:
Uj = Q
0
j0Q
1
j1Q
2
j2 ,
where i 2 (0; 1), for i 2 f0; 1; 2g, Qji is the consumption of good i in country j, andP
i i = 1. Labor is the only production input. Good 0 is the numeraire good produced
with a constant returns technology and is freely traded within and between countries. This
numeraire good is not subject to currency exchange. We normalize the labor productivity
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of good 0 to 1, and hence wages are also normalized to 1 in both countries.
Goods 1 and 2 are both di¤erentiated and tradeable, and the composite Qji is made by
Qji =
 Z

ji
[qji (!)]
i 1
i d!
! i
i 1
;
where qji (!) is the consumption of variety !, and 
ji denotes the set of the varieties of
good i consumed in country j. The elasticity of substitution is i in industry i. We assume
that 2 < 1, so that good 2 has a lower price elasticity than good 1. Trade in the two
di¤erentiated industries is subject to currencies and the exchange rate, i.e., people sell and
buy the goods with the countrys currency if the trade is within the country, and if trade
is between countries, then currency exchange is needed. Barring frictions, the real exchange
rate of these goods across countries is 1. However, there are numerous factors/distortions
that will create a bias of the real exchange rate from 1. Especially in the xed-exchange-rate
regime, the real exchange rate may di¤er signicantly from 1. Say, a unit of a good in the
U.S. can be exchanged for e < 1 units of the same good in China (hence one unit of good in
China can be exchanged for e 1 > 1 units in the U.S.). From here onward, we assume that
the real exchange rate from a Norths to a Souths good is e < 1, which captures the fact
that the South often uses the exchange rate as a policy tool to implement an export-oriented
development strategy.
On top of the exchange-rate distortion, trade between countries is also subject to standard
iceberg trade cost so that to deliver one unit to the other country,  > 1 units needs to be
shipped. By paying an entry cost , each rm draws a distinct variety (and hence is a
monopolist for it) and can produce the good with constant marginal cost c. Firms can price
discriminate across countries. The probability that a variety will be in industry i is given by
i, and 1 + 2 = 1. Free entry determines the number of rms Mj in each country j. The
number of rms in industry i in country j is therefore Mji = iMj.
Note a key di¤erence between e and  in the model.4 Here, an increase of the trade
cost  increases import prices in both countries and the degree of separation between the
two markets, whereas an decrease in e increases the Souths import prices while decreasing
the Norths import prices. Hence, e has an asymmetric e¤ect, whereas the e¤ect of  is
symmetric. Having multiple sectors with di¤erent i and the asymmetric e¤ect of e consid-
erably increases the complexity of the model, and hence for tractability and for our purpose
of illustrating sectoral shifts, we opt to go with a homogeneous-rm model, instead of a
4As will be more clear after Proposition 1, the role of trade cost  is indispensible, because without it,
i.e.,  = 1, there wont an equilibrium, since all the rms will earn more prot in the South than the North,
making it impossible for the free entry condition to hold in both countries.
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heterogeneous-rm one.
2.2 Equilibrium and the E¤ect of the Exchange Rate
Let pji (!) be the price of variety ! of industry i that faces the consumers in j. The Cobb-
Douglas-CES structure implies that the total sales of variety ! of industry i in country j
is
rji (!)  pji (!) qji (!) = iLj

pji (!)
Pji
1 i
;
where Pji is the standard price index Pji =
R

ji
pji (!)
1 i d!
 1
1 i . Let pIni denote the price
of an imported good in the North (from a South rm).5 A Souths rm prot is
si = (psi   c) qsi (psi) +
 
e 1pIni   c

qni
 
pIni

= (psi   c) (psi) i iLs
P 1 isi
+
 
e 1pIni   c
  
pIni
 i iLn
P 1 ini
.
Equilibrium pricing follows a standard markup rule, where the markup is denoted as
i =
i
i 1 . In particular, the e¤ective (delivered) marginal cost c is incurred in the South,
and the price in the Souths viewpoint is e 1pIni = ic. Hence, psi = ic, p
I
ni = iec, and
the prot of a Souths rm is
si = i (i   1) ii c1 i

Ls
P 1 isi
+ e i 1 i
Ln
P 1 ini

:
Similarly, for the North, we have pni (c) = ic, p
I
si (c) = ie
 1c, and ni is similarly derived.
The price indices are rewritten as
P 1 isi = i (ic)
1 i
h
Ms +Mn
 
e 1
1 ii ,
P 1 ini = i (ic)
1 i Mn +Ms (e)1 i
An entrants expected prot in the South is
Es = 1s1 + 2s2   
= 11 (1   1) 11 c1 1

Ls
P 1 1s1
+ e 1 1 1
Ln
P 1 1n1

+22 (2   1) 22 c1 2

Ls
P 1 2s2
+ e 2 1 2
Ln
P 1 2n2

  .
5Note that pIni is the sales of one unit of a good with the North currency (but denominated in numeraire),
and these convert to more than enough South currency to buy one unit (e 1 > 1).
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Zero expected prot condition is then Es = 0 = En, which entails
1
1

Ln (1  e 1 1 1)
m+ (e)1 1
+
Ls (e
1 1 1   1)
1 +m (e 1)1 1

=
2
2

Ln (e
 2 1 2   1)
m+ (e)1 2
+
Ls (1  e2 1 2)
1 +m (e 1)1 2

;
(1)
where m  Mn
Ms
is the ratio of entry between the two countries. The equilibrium entry ratio
m satises (1), and the level ofMs andMn can be determined by Es = 0 (or, equivalently,
En = 0). In the following proposition, we show that when trade cost  is su¢ ciently large,
there is a unique nite equilibrium entry ratiom > 0, which implies that equilibrium entries
in both countries are positive. Moreover, m strictly increases with an appreciation of the
Souths currency.
Proposition 1 Denote ` = Ln=Ls. Let a is the solution of  to the following equation.
e

 1
 
e 1`

+  1 

= e 1`+ 1,
and
 b 
8><>: max
(
1; 2
1
1 

e (1 + `e 1) +
q
e2 (1 + `e 1)2   4`e 1
 1
 1
)
if 4`e 1  e2 (1 + `e 1)2
1 if 4`e 1 > e2 (1 + `e 1)2
.
Let ^ i = max fai;  big, where ai and  bi are the values of a and  b when  = i. Suppose
the trade cost  is such that  > ^  max f^ 1; ^ 2g. Then, there exists a unique nite
equilibrium entry ratio m > 0 (positive entries in both countries), and m strictly increases
in e.
Proof. See the appendix.
To understand this proposition, think of the case of  = 1 and Ln = Ls. In this case, there
is no separation between the two countries, and the two countries are symmetric, except that
the Souths rms enjoy an edge due to exchange-rate distortion (e < 1). Hence, all rms in
the South enjoy larger prots than those in the North, and m = 0 in equilibrium (Mn = 0).
On the other hand, if  !1, then the e¤ect of e < 1 becomes nil and there must be positive
entries in both countries. Hence, a su¢ ciently large  is required to have enough separation
between the two markets.6 Since an increase in e implies that the Souths rmsedge due to
6The condition also involves the ratio of country size ` = Ln=Ls because it is possible that given an e
and  , m becomes innity (Ms = 0) when ` is very large so that the advantage of the South due to e is
reversed due to the large population in the North and the home market e¤ect. Nevertheless, regardless of
the value of e and `, as long as  is su¢ ciently large, positive entries in both countries are guaranteed.
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the exchange rate is reduced, and hence we expect less entry in the South and more in the
North, leading to an increased m.
2.3 Export Structure and the Exchange Rate
Here, we rst want to investigate the conditions under which Xs2
Xs1+Xs2
< Xn2
Xn1+Xn2
, that is,
the more developed countrys (Norths) export in industry 2 is more than that of the less
developed country (the South). This is equivalent to Xs2
Xs1
< Xn2
Xn1
. We also want to investigate
whether d
de
Xs2
Xs1
> 0 and d
de
Xn2
Xn1
< 0 so that the export structure of the two countries become
more similar when the Souths currency appreciates. Note that export volume from the
South in industry i is Xsi =Msie 1pIniqni
 
pIni

. So,
Xs2
Xs1
=
2
1 2
2 2
1
1 1
1 1
P 1 1n1
P 1 2n2
(ec)1 2 : (2)
Similarly,
Xn2
Xn1
=
2
1 2
2 2
1
1 1
1 1
P 1 1s1
P 1 2s2
 
e 1c
1 2 : (3)
In the short run, Mn and Ms (and hence m) are xed. If price indices were also xed,
then obviously Xs2
Xs1
increases with e, as 1 > 2. This is basically an intensive margin e¤ect
that when the Souths goods become more expensive, the quantities demanded and sales in
the North for these goods are reduced, but the e¤ect is stronger for good 1 than good 2,
because good 1 has a larger price elasticity. Proposition 2 shows that this e¤ect at intensive
margin is robust when taking into account the adjustment of price indices and free entry
in the long run. It also provides two su¢ cient conditions under which Xn2
Xn1
> Xs2
Xs1
holds,
and hence the export structures in the two countries become more similar with a currency
appreciation.
Proposition 2 Suppose that 2 < 1, e  1, and  > ^ so that there is a unique equilibrium
with positive entries in both countries (Proposition 1). Then,
1. Both in the short run when entries Mn and Ms are xed and in the long run when
entries are determined by free entry, d
de

Xs2
Xs1

> 0 and d
de

Xn2
Xn1

< 0. That is, the
Souths export in industry 2 relative to that in industry 1 increases when currency in
the South appreciates.
2. If one of the following conditions holds, then in equilibrium Xn2
Xn1
> Xs2
Xs1
, and the export
structure in the South becomes closer to that in the North when the Souths currency
appreciates.
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(a) The two countries have the same population size, i.e., Ln = Ls, and the real
exchange rate is such that e < 1.
(b) The South has a larger population, i.e., Ls > Ln, and the real exchange rate is
e = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given the empirical nding in the next subsection that developed countries export rela-
tively more goods with low elasticity of substitution, the more important message of Propo-
sition 2 is Point 1, because given this fact, currency appreciation leads to a more similar
export structure. Point 2 shows some conditions under which the above-mentioned fact can
be generated from the model. The intuition behind Point 2(a) is that e < 1 creates an
advantage for producers in the South, and this advantage is more pronounced for industry
1 because the price elasticity is larger. Although we do not model how the wages are deter-
mined, it is worthwhile noting that the price advantage of the South reected by e < 1 is
similar to the e¤ect when the Souths wages are lower than the Norths, which is tting to
the U.S.-China scenario. Point 2(b) holds mainly because the home market e¤ect is more
pronounced for the good with larger price elasticity. It is easy to verify numerically that the
same result holds in the convex combination of these two conditions, i.e., the case of Ls  Ln
and e  1.7
2.4 Developed Countries Export Relatively More Goods with Low
Elasticity of Substitution
Our theoretical analysis shows that when the South appreciates its currency, its exports
become more skewed towards the industry with lower elasticity of substitution, and the
export structure becomes more similar to developed countries. To connect our theoretical and
empirical analyses, it is important to examine whether developed countries export relatively
more goods with low elasticity of substitution. To this end, we examine the correlation
between two relevant measures: an index developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2007) called PRODY that measures how heavily a good is exported by developed countries
(see Section 3.1 for more details of this measurement) and a goods estimated elasticity of
7It is also possible to explain the di¤erence in export structure via technological di¤erences. One can
think of this as n = n2n1 >
s2
s1
= s, i.e., the North rm is more able and hence more likely to produce
goods in industry 2, and there may be some natural association between technology and markups. When
n > s, it is almost trivial that Xn2Xn1 >
Xs2
Xs1
, but since the e¤ect of the exchange rate is mainly a price one,
the result that the Souths export structure moving closer to the Norths should remain similar, at least in
the short run.
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substitution by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Figure 1 shows a nonparametric relationship
between the elasticity of substitution that we obtain from Broda and Weinstein (2006) and
the export similarity index used in our empirical analysis. Clearly, there is a fairly strong
negative correlation between these two.8
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Data and Variables
Our study draws on data from two sources. The rst one is the China Customs data from
2000 (the earliest year of the data) to 2006 (the most recent year the authors have access
to). The data set is at rm-product-destination-month level, covering a universe of all
monthly import and export transactions by Chinese exporters and importers. Specically, it
includes product information (HS 8-digit-level classication), trade value, identity of Chinese
importers and exporters, and import and export destinations.
The second data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) maintained by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), from which we obtain the monthly bilateral nominal
exchange rates between China and the U.S. for the 2000-2006 period.
To characterize Chinas export structure to the U.S., we rst construct an index that
di¤erentiates each export product. Specically, we use the measurement developed by Haus-
mann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), i.e.,
PRODYi =
1
Ni
X
j
Xij
Xj
GDPPCj;
where Xij is the export value of good i by country j; Xj is country js total export value;
GDPPCj is the real per capita GDP of country j; and Ni is a normalization term used to
have the coe¢ cients summed up to 1. The intuition behind this measurement is that a good
with a higher value of PRODYi is exported more often by developed countries.
In the empirical analysis, we use COMTRADE data to compute PRODYi for each HS-6
8Both PRODY and elasticity of substitution are at HS 3-digit level. The PRODY at
HS 3-digit level is the trade-weighted average of PRODY at HS 6-digit level. The HS 3-
digit elasticity of substitution is estimated based on U.S. trade data, and downloaded from
http://www.columbia.edu/~dew35/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities.html, see Broda, Greeneld, and We-
instein (2006). Moreover, the tted curve excludes the top 5% sigma, i.e. 7 sigmas with a value greater than
10.
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product in 2000 (the initial year of our data),9 and then use the China Customs data to
obtain a measure of overall export structure Ycm (denoted as Export Similarity Index) for
each city c in each month m during the period of 2000-2006, i.e.,
Ycm =
X
i
PRODYi
Xicm
Xcm
;
where Xicm is the export value of good i to the U.S. by city c at month m; and Xcm is the
total export value to the U.S. by city c at month m.
By xing PRODYi in the initial year, we attribute the change in the city-level measure-
ment Ycm to the change in the allocation of exports across di¤erent product categories (i.e.,
changes inXicm
Xcm
). In other words, this approach allows us to capture the change in the ex-
port structure, specically, the similarity of export structure between China and developed
countries.
To get a sense of PRODYi, we list in Table 1 the ve HS-6 product categories with the
lowest values of PRODYi and the ve HS-6 product categories with the highest values. Con-
sistent with our intuition, goods with the lowest values of PRODYi are largely agricultural
products, such as Vegetable products nes, Sisal and Agave (raw), and Cloves (whole
fruit, cloves, and stems). In the meantime, goods with the highest values of PRODYi are
mostly metallic goods, such as Cermets and articles thereof (waste or scrap), Sections
H iron or non-alloy steel (nfw hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m), Sheet piling of iron or
steel, and Flat-rolled iron or non-alloy steel (coated with aluminium, width > 600mm).
[Insert Table 1 Here]
An alternative measurement of export structure in the literature is the one proposed by
Schott (2008), based on Finger and Kreinin (1979)s export similarity index (ESI). Specif-
ically, it calculates the similarity between Chinas export structure and those of some de-
veloped countries (such as OECD countries), and the higher values mean more similarity.
To calculate this measure, we need export data from other developed countries, which are
available to us at the yearly frequency (i.e., via UNs COMTRADE data). However, our iden-
tication requires a measure at the monthly level. Nonetheless, we nd that the yearly cor-
relation between the export similarity indices developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2007) and by Schott (2008) is 0:859, suggesting a robustness of using the former measure.
9Results remain robust when we measure PRODYi in other years before currency appreciation.
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3.2 Chinas Exchange-Rate Reform in July 2005
Timeline. Since the nancial crackdown in 1994, China had adopted a decade-old xed-
exchange-rate regime, in which her currency (renminbi) was pegged to the U.S. dollar at
an exchange rate of 8:28. At 19:00 on July 21, 2005 (Beijing time), the Peoples Bank of
China (PBOC, the central bank of China) suddenly announced a revaluation of Chinese
currency against the U.S. dollar, which was set to be traded at an exchange rate of 8:11
immediately or about 2:1% appreciation. After that, renminbi was allowed to trade exibly
with a reference basket of currencies with the target for renminbi set by the PBOC every
day. Figure 2 displays the monthly exchange rate between Chinese currency and the U.S.
dollar during 2000-2006. It is clear that there was a sudden appreciation of Chinese currency
against the U.S. dollar in July 2005, followed by steady and continuous appreciation. By the
end of 2006, renminbi had accumulated appreciation of about 5:5% against the U.S. dollar.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Exogeneity. The crucial part of our identication is to use the currency appreciation
in China in mid-July 2005 as an exogenous shock; hence, it is important to establish the
exogeneity of Chinas currency appreciation upfront. Note that the revaluation of Chinese
currency in mid-July 2005 happened during a period of enormous international pressures on
the Chinese government to appreciate her undervalued currency. However, the exact timing
of the change has been widely considered as unexpected. There is much anecdotal evidence
as well as academic studies supporting this statement.
First, foreign pressures on renminbi appreciation had existed for more than two years, and
the Chinese government regarded the exchange-rate policy as a matter of Chinas sovereignty
and rejected any political pressures on this issue. For example, on June 26, 2005 (about a
month before the currency revaluation), Chinas Premier Wen Jiabao said at the Sixth Asia-
Europe Finance Ministers Meeting in Tianjin that China would independently determine
the modality, timing, and content of reformsand rejected foreign pressures for an immediate
shift in the nations currency regime.10 One day later, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the
PBOC, said that it was too soon to drop the decade-old xed-exchange-rate regime and that
he had no plans to discuss the currency issue at the weekend meeting of the global central
bankers in Basel, Switzerland.11 On July 19, two days before the reform, the PBOC still
10See Chinese Premier Warns against Yuan Reform Haste by the Wall Street Journal
(http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111975074805069620) Access date: October 9, 2012.
11See Chinas Zhou Says Time Is Not Ripe to Drop Yuan Peg to Dollar by Bloomberg
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVAXsXEqKZcY&refer=home) Access
date: October 9, 2012.
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insisted that it would continue to keep the exchange rate stable and at a reasonable and
balanced level in the second half of the year.12
Second, as elaborated by Yuan (2012), opinions were divergent among Chinese pol-
icy makers regarding whether Chinese currency should be appreciated during that period.
Specically, the Ministry of Commerce opposed the currency appreciation (so as to maintain
the competitiveness of Chinas export sector), while the other three central governmental
agencies: the PBOC, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry
of Finance, all proposed to appreciate Chinese currency.
Third, after the reform, both domestic and international medias responded to the reval-
uation with complete surprise. For example, CNN reported the episode as The surprise
move by China....13 In the Financial Timesfamous Lex Column on July 22, 2005 it was
reported that China likes to do things [in] its own way. After resisting pressure to revalue
the renminbi for so long, Beijing has moved sooner than even John Snow, the U.S. Treasury
secretary, expected.14 On July 22, 2005 the BBC Worldwide Monitoring said that The
Peoples Bank of China [PBOC] unexpectedly announced last night that the RMB [renminbi]
will appreciate by 2 per cent and will no longer be pegged to the U.S. dollar.15
Fourth, academic studies also imply that the change in the exchange-rate policy in July
2005 was unexpected. For example, Eichengreen and Tong (2011) study the impact of the
renminbi revaluation announcement on rm value in the 2005-2010 period. Using the change
of stock prices before and after the announcement of the revaluation for 6,050 rms in 44
countries, they nd that renminbi appreciation signicantly increases rm values for those
exporting to China while signicantly decreases rm values for those competing with Chinese
rms in their home markets, suggesting the exogeneity of the policy change.
3.3 Estimation Framework
To identify the e¤ect of currency appreciation on export structure, we exploit the sudden and
unexpected currency revaluation by the Chinese government on July 21, 2005. Specically,
the unexpectedness in the currency revaluation makes the export structure before the reval-
uation a good counterfactual to the one after the revaluation. In other words, the exogenous
currency appreciation in China o¤ers us a regression discontinuity (RD) setting, which is
12See China to Keep RMB Exchange Rate Basically Stable: Central Bank by Peoples Daily
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/20/eng20050720_197148.html) Access date: October 9, 2012.
13See World Events Rattle Futuresby CNN (http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/21/markets/stockswatch/index.htm)
Access date: October 9, 2012.
14See Renminimal THE LEX COLUMNby Financial Times
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) Access date: October 9, 2012.
15See Hong Kong Daily Says Exchange Rate Reform Advantageous Overallby BBC Worldwide Moni-
toring (http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) Access date: October 9, 2012.
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arguably closest in the observational data analysis to the experimental design (e.g., Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) show that the RD estimator () can be identied
as
 = lim
m#m0
E [ycmjm]  lim
m"m0
E [ycmjm] ;
where ycm = lnYcm; and m0 = July 2005 is the cuto¤ month of the currency revaluation in
China. Empirically, we focus on the data of the year 2005, use the local linear regression
(as suggested by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001) with the triangle kernel function
and the optimal bandwidth selected based on the procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), and obtain standard errors through the bootstrapping method.
However, there are two potential concerns about the above RD estimator. First, it
may also capture the seasonal e¤ect. For example, it could be that demand in the U.S. is
di¤erent between July and August, causing the composition of Chinese exports to the U.S.
to be di¤erent in these two months. In other words, ^RD becomes +month, where month is
the monthly e¤ect of exports. Second, the RD estimator essentially compares Chinas export
structure to the U.S. in August 2005 with that in July 2005. Hence, one may be concerned
whether the appreciation e¤ect can be realized within such a short time window, especially
given some pre-existing procurement contracts and the complexity of production.
To address these concerns, we include data of a year during which Chinese currency was
xed against the U.S. dollar, as a control group. Specically, we choose the year 2003 as the
month of Chinese New Year was the same for 2003 and 2005 (i.e., February), but di¤erent
between 2004 and 2005 (i.e., January in 2004). Assuming the monthly e¤ect is the same for
these two years, we use a DD analysis to isolate the currency appreciation e¤ect from the
monthly e¤ect, i.e.,
ycmt = t +   Augm  Y 2005t +  m + "cmt; (4)
where t 2 f2003; 2005g represents year; t is the year xed e¤ect; Augi = I [m  m0] is
an indicator of post-appreciation month;16 Y 2005t = I [t = 2005] is an indicator of the year
2005; and  m captures the monthly e¤ect. The standard errors are clustered at the month
level, following Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004).
In addition to purging the monthly e¤ect, the DD estimator, by comparing the ve-month
average export structure in the post-appreciation period with the seven-months average in the
16Empirically, we round m0 to August as we only observe monthly trade data. Nonetheless, dening that
the month of July has a value of 1=3 produces similar estimates (results available upon request).
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pre-appreciation period, reasonably captures the short-term e¤ect of currency appreciation
on export structure.
Note that Equation (4) uses an unbalanced city-level sample without inclusion of city
xed e¤ects. Hence, we are estimating the overall e¤ect of currency appreciation on export
structure. Later, we will experiment with the regression with the inclusion of city xed
e¤ects (which captures the within-city and across-rms e¤ect of currency appreciation) and
the regression using rm-level data with the inclusion of rm xed e¤ects (which captures
the within-rm and across-products e¤ect of currency appreciation).
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports our estimates of the currency-appreciation e¤ect on the structure of Chinese
exports to the U.S. Column 1 shows the RD estimate using data of the year 2005. It is found
that currency appreciation has a negligible e¤ect on export structure: the e¤ect is  0:2%
and statistically insignicant.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
However, such estimates may be biased due to some seasonal e¤ects, e.g., U.S. demand
di¤erence between July and August. Column 2 presents the DD estimate by using data
of the year 2003 as a control group. The DD estimate becomes positive and statistically
signicant, implying that currency appreciation makes the structure of Chinese exports to
the U.S. more similar to those by developed countries.
Figure 3 presents graphically the results corresponding to Table 2: the dots and crosses
represent the mean value of the similarity of Chinese export structure with developed coun-
tries(in logarithm) for each month in 2003 and 2005, respectively; whereas the tted curves
are calculated using local linear regression with triangle kernel function. Clearly, the export
similarity value dropped signicantly from July 2003 to August 2003, suggesting a strong
monthly e¤ect. Di¤erencing out such monthly e¤ects, there was a sizable increase in the
similarity value between July 2005 and August 2005, consistent with our estimates in Table
2. Meanwhile, export similarity values from January to June in 2003 and 2005 followed quite
parallel trends, lending support to the argument that currency revaluation in July 2005 was
largely exogenous and data in 2003 constructs a good comparison group for data in 2005.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
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Note that our estimates of the appreciation e¤ect on export structure could be under-
estimated due to at least two reasons. Firstly, despite the fact that the exact timing of
currency revaluation (i.e., July 2005) was completely unexpected, there had been some ex-
pectation that the Chinese government might revalue her currency since mid-2004. Such
an expectation may make some producers change their behavior (like product upgrading
decisions) earlier than the occurence of currency appreciation, causing an underestimation
of our e¤ect of interest. Secondly, our DD estimator captures largely a short-term e¤ect of
currency appreciation. In the long run, producers can upgrade their technologies, acquire
advanced management practices, and recruit intelligent employees, all of which make our
estimate underestimated.
4.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present a battery of robustness checks on our aforementioned estima-
tion results in Table 3.
Alternative way of controlling for the monthly e¤ect. While the inclusion of
the year 2003 data helps us control for the monthly e¤ect arising from the U.S. market
situation, one may be concerned that the economic environment in China changed from
July 2005 to August 2005, which spuriously generates the positive relationship between
currency appreciation and change in the export structure.17 As a check on such concerns,
we look at the structure of Chinese exports to Nigeria, a country whose currency remained
stable against Chinese currency in 2003 and 2005 especially between July and August (see
Appendix Figure 1 for details). Column 1 of Table 3 reports a DD estimate of equation (4)
using Chinese export data to Nigeria. It is found that the estimated coe¢ cient is highly
insignicant and the magnitude is close to zero, indicating no signicant changes in the
Chinese market situation at the time of currency revaluation.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
DDD estimation. In Column 2 of Table 3, we combine Chinese export data to the
U.S. in 2003 and 2005 with Chinese export data to Nigeria in 2003 and 2005, and conduct
a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DDD) estimation, which enables us to control for
the monthly e¤ect arising from changes in both Chinese and foreign markets. Clearly, we
nd a estimate of 0:017, similar to that in Column 2 of Table 2 (i.e., 0:018), suggesting the
robustness of our previous ndings.
17Note that tari¤ reduction in China happened in the beginning instead of in the middle of the year; as a
result, tari¤ reduction shall not contaminate our estimates.
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Placebo test pre-revaluation period. Given that Chinese currency was pegged
to the U.S. dollar in 2002 and 2003, there was no break in the exchange rate between July
and August in these years. Meanwhile, tari¤ reduction in China happened in the beginning
instead of in the middle of the year; as a result, tari¤ reduction shall not contaminate our
estimation. Hence, a DD estimation using data of the year 2002 and the year 2003 shall
generate zero appreciation e¤ect. Indeed, we nd, in Column 3 of Table 3, the DD estimator
is highly insignicant and its magnitude is close to zero.
U.S. exports to China. As the appreciation of Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar
means the depreciation of the latter against the former, we shall expect a reversed sign using
the U.S.s export structure to China as the outcome variable. Column 4 of Table 3 reports
the DD estimate using Chinese imports from the U.S. in 2003 and 2005. Consistently, we nd
a negative and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cient, implying that the appreciation
of Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar makes U.S. exports to China more similar to
those exported by developing countries.
Exclusion of processing trade. A unique feature of the Chinese trade system is that
China allows some rms to import intermediate inputs free of tari¤s but to export all their
output, the so-called processing trade regime (e.g., Yu, 2014). One may be concerned that
our results are driven by this special trade regime, hence compromising the external validity
of our ndings. To address such concern, we, in Column 5 of Table 3, focus on the analysis
of ordinary exports. Evidently, we still nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of
appreciation on export similarity towards developed countriesexport structures. Meanwhile,
despite a slight drop, the estimated magnitude (0:014) is statistically indi¤erent from the
estimate in our benchmark model (i.e., 0:018 in Column 2 of Table 2).
4.3 Decomposition of the E¤ect of Currency Appreciation
In this section, we use our data to decompose the resource reallocation at di¤erent margins
(i.e., across cities, across rms within a city, and across products within a rm). Our previous
analyses use an unbalanced city/rm sample; hence, the DD estimate in Column 2 of Table
2 is the overall e¤ect of currency appreciation, including resource reallocation across cities,
within city and across rms, and within rm and across products. To decompose the currency
appreciation e¤ect on export structure into these three di¤erent margins, we conduct two
more regressions in Table 4. Specically, in Column 1, we include city dummies and in
Column 2, we use a sample of surviving multi-product exporters (i.e., those that existed
before and after currency revaluation) with an inclusion of rm dummies.18
18Note that we put the change in export revenues for single-product rms in the category of the resource
reallocation within city and across rms.
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Both coe¢ cients are found to be positive and statistically signicant, consistent with our
previous ndings. Meanwhile, as the analysis with the inclusion of city dummies essentially
calculates the e¤ect of appreciation on the within-city change in export structure, the com-
parison of the coe¢ cient with the one without city dummies (i.e., the one in Column 2 of
Table 2) can give us the degree of across-cities resource reallocation e¤ect of currency appre-
ciation. Similarly, the comparison of coe¢ cients between Column 1 and Column 2 can allow
us to gauge the magnitude of within-city, across-rms resource reallocation e¤ect of currency
appreciation. Finally, the coe¢ cient in Column 2 produces the within-rm, across-products
resource reallocation e¤ect of currency appreciation.
It is found that the majority of the currency appreciation e¤ect on export structure comes
from the resource reallocation within city and across rms, i.e., accounting for (0:015  
0:002)=0:018 = 72:22%. Meanwhile, the across-cities resource reallocation accounts for
around (0:018   0:015)=0:018 = 16:67%, while the within-rm, across-products resource
reallocation accounts for 11:11%.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether and how a countrys export structure responds to its exchange-
rate movement. Using Chinas sudden and unexpected revaluation of its currency against
the U.S. dollar, we identify the e¤ect of exchange rates on export structure through the com-
bined regression discontinuity and di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework. We nd that after its
currency appreciation, Chinas exports to the U.S. became more similar to those by devel-
oped countries. Meanwhile, we nd that the majority of the currency-appreciation e¤ect on
export structure comes from the resource reallocation within city and across rms.
The major implication of our empirical ndings is that the depreciation strategy used by
developed countries may reduce the import competition from developing countries, but not
by much. Despite of the fact that our empirical results are necessarily short-term by the iden-
tication strategy, changes in export structure may have important long-run implications,
especially with the resource reallocation and learning-by-doing e¤ects.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Using (1), we can dene the equilibrium entry ratiom to be the solution to F (m; e; 1; 2; 1; 2) =
0, where
F (m; e; 1; 2; 1; 2)  1
1

Ln (1  e 1 1 1)
m+ (e)1 1
+
Ls (e
1 1 1   1)
1 +m (e 1)1 1

+
2
2

Ln (1  e 2 1 2)
m+ (e)1 2
+
Ls (e
2 1 2   1)
1 +m (e 1)1 2

 H(m; e; 1; 1) +H(m; e; 2; 2);
where
H(m; e; ; ) =



Ln (1  e  1 )
m+ (e)1 
+
Ls (e
 1    1)
1 +m (e 1)1 

: (5)
Note that H(0; e; ; ) > 0 if and only if
e 1` 2 2    e 1`+ 1  1 + e > 0: (6)
Let x =  1, and  a (x)  e 1`x2   (e 1`+ 1) x + e. Hence, (6) holds if and only if
 a (x) > 0.  a (x) is a parabola opening upward with  a (1) =  e 1` + e   1 < 0. Hence,
there are two positive roots to  a (x) = 0, and one is less than 1 and one is greater than 1.
Since  > 1, there is only one  satisfying e [ 1 (e 1`) +  1 ] = e 1` + 1. Denote this
value of  as a. So, H(0; e; ; ) > 0 holds if and only if  > a.
We now show that there exists a unique positive number m^ dened as the solution to
1+m(e 1)
1 
m+(e)1  =
1 e1 
1 e 1 
Ls
Ln
such that H > 0 for m < m^, and H < 0 for m > m^. Observe
from (5) that H > 0 if and only if
1 +m (e 1)1 
m+ (e)1 
>
1  e 1 
1  e  1 
Ls
Ln
 G; (7)
the right-hand side of which is positive because e 1  < e  1  < 1. The second inequality
holds because  > a implies that  > e
  
 1 , because H(0; e; ; ) < 0 when  = e 

 1 .
The left-hand side of (7) strictly decreases in m from e 1 1 at m = 0 to e 1 1  when
m ! 1. If G  e 1 1, then H  0 for all m  0, which contradicts that H > 0 at
m = 0. So,  > a guarantees that G < e 1 1. If G  e 1 1 , then H > 0 for all
m  0, and we also have F > 0 for all m  0. In this case, equilibrium is such that Ms = 0
so that all rms are located in the North. To rule out this scenario, we must also impose
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that G > e 1 1 , which is equivalent to
 2 2    e + `e 1  1 + `e 1 > 0:
Again, let x =  1 and  b (x)  x2   (e + `e 1)x + `e 1.  b (x) is a parabola opening
upward with its minimum at (e + `e 1) =2.
 b

e + `e 1
2

= `e 1   (e
 + `e 1)2
4
:
Note that  b (1) = (1  e) (1 + `e 1) > 0. We distinguish the following cases. If e+`e 12 
1, then   1 is at the strictly increasing portion of the parabola. Since  b (1) > 0,  b (x) > 0
for all  > 1. So, we dont need any extra restriction in this case. If e
+`e 1
2
> 1 and
 b

e+`e 1
2

> 0, then  b (x) > 0 for all  > 1. But if e
+`e 1
2
> 1 and  b

e+`e 1
2

 0,
then  b (x) > 0 for all  > 2
  1
 1

e + `e 1 +
q
(e + `e 1)2   4`e 1
 1
 1
. In sum, we can
dene
 b =
8><>: max
(
1; 2 
1
 1

e + `e 1 +
q
(e + `e 1)2   4`e 1
 1
 1
)
if 4`e 1  (e + `e 1)2
1 if 4`e 1 > (e + `e 1)2
:
Thus, G > e 1 1  for all  >  b. Let ^ i = max fai;  big, where ai and  bi are the values
of a and  b when  = i. Also let ^ = max f^ 1; ^ 2g. Hence, when  > ^ ,
ei 1i 1 > Gi > ei 1 1 i, (8)
and a nite m^i > 0 is the unique solution to
1+mi(e 1)
1 i
mi+(e)
1 i = Gi. Then,Hi  H(m; e; i; i) >
0 for m < m^i, and Hi < 0 for m > m^i.
Now, denote m^max = max fm^1; m^2g and m^min = min fm^1; m^2g. Since F = H1 + H2,
F > 0 for m 2 [0; m^min], and F > 0 for m 2 [m^max;1). By continuity, any equilibrium m
such that F (m; :::) = 0 must be in (m^min; m^max). Moreover, if m is unique, then we have
@F=@m < 0 at m. Since @F=@e > 0 (because @H=@e > 0) and @F=@m < 0, we have, at m,
dm
de
=  
@F
@e
@F
@m
> 0.
The rest of the proof proves the uniqueness of m, and for this purpose, we use the
Descartesrule of signs to show that there is exactly one positive root of F = 0. Observe
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that
F =
Am3 +Bm2 + Cm+D
m+ (e)1 1
 
1 +m (e 1)1 1
 
m+ (e)1 2
 
1 +m (e 1)1 2
 ;
where
A = K1
 
e 1
1 2 +K2  e 11 1
B = P1
 
e 1
1 2 + P2  e 11 1 +K1  1 +  2 22+K2  1 +  2 21
C = P1
 
1 +  2 22

+ P2
 
1 +  2 21

+K1 (e)
1 2 +K2 (e)
1 1
D = P1 (e)
1 2 + P2 (e)
1 1 ;
where
Ki =
i
i
h
Ln
 
1  e i 1 i  e 11 i + Ls  ei 1 i   1i
Pi =
i
i

Ln
 
1  e i 1 i+ (e)1 i Ls  ei 1 i   1 :
Since F = 0 if and only if Am3+Bm2+Cm+D = 0, it su¢ ces to show that there is exactly
one positive root to this polynomial. By (8), we know that
Ki =
iLn (1  e i 1 i)
i

ei 1 1 i  G < 0,
Pi =
iLn (1  e i 1 i) (e)1 i
i

ei 1i 1  G > 0.
Hence, A < 0, D > 0, and
B =
" 
e 1
1 2 +  1 +  2 22 e1 1 1 1   1 e11 11 e 11 1 LsLn
e1 11 1   1 e11 1
1 e 11 1
Ls
Ln
(e)1 1
#
P1
+
" 
e 1
1 1 +  1 +  2 21 e2 1 1 2   1 e21 21 e 21 2 LsLn
e2 12 1   1 e21 2
1 e 21 2
Ls
Ln
(e)2 1
#
P2
C =
"
1 +  2 22 + (e)1 2
e1 1 1 1   1 e11 1
1 e 11 1
Ls
Ln
e1 11 1   1 e11 1
1 e 11 1
Ls
Ln
(e)1 1
#
P1
+
"
1 +  2 21 + (e)1 1
e2 1 1 2   1 e21 2
1 e 21 2
Ls
Ln
e2 12 1   1 e21 2
1 e 21 2
Ls
Ln
(e)2 1
#
P2
So, because 1+  2 2i > 1 > (e 1)1 i and 1+  2 2i > 1 > (e)1 i, B < C. To apply the
rule of signs, distinguish three cases, C > B > 0, 0 > C > B, and C > 0 > B. Combined
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with the facts that A < 0 and D > 0, there is exactly one positive root in each case. Hence,
m is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
Observe that d
de

Xs2
Xs1

> 0 if and only if
d
de

P 1 1n1
P 1 2n2
e1 2

=
d
de
 
1 (1c)
1 1 m+ (e)1 1
2 (2c)
1 2 m+ (e)1 2e1 2
!
> 0,
which is positive if and only if
d
de
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
> 0:
In the short run when m is kept xed, we have
@
@e
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
=
e 12 1 [m2(e)1+2(1   2) +m(e)1+1(1   1) m(e)2+1(2   1)]
[e +m(e)2 ]2
:
It is easy to verify that ^ > e 1 by checking (6) and so e > 1. Hence, the above derivative
is positive. Next, in the long run when m is not xed, we must examine
@
@m
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
=
e 1 1+2 [(e)1   (e)2 ]
[e +m(e)2 ]2
;
which is positive since e > 1. From Proposition 1, dm
de
> 0, and hence at m,
d
de
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
=
@
@e
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
+
@
@m
 
m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2
!
dm
de
> 0:
Hence, d
de

Xs2
Xs1

> 0. The proof for d
de

Xn2
Xn1

< 0 is similar.
For Point 2, rst observe from (2) and (3), Xn2
Xn1
> Xs2
Xs1
if and only if
P 1 1s1
P 1 2s2
 
e 1
1 2 > P 1 1n1
P 1 2n2
e1 2 ;
24
if and only if
1 +m (e 1)1 1
1 +m (e 1)1 2
 
e 1
1 2 > m+ (e)1 1
m+ (e)1 2
e1 2 : (9)
We can rst look at a special case where e = 1. The only di¤erence between two countries
in this case is the scenario when Ln 6= Ls. When Ls > Ln, m = MnMs < 1. With e = 1
and m < 1, it is easy to verify that (9) holds. This proves Point 2(b). For Point 2(a), let
Ln = Ls. When e = 1, m = 1 and (9) holds in equality, i.e., Xs2Xs1 =
Xn2
Xn1
. By Point 1, when
e < 1, Xs2
Xs1
< Xn2
Xn1
holds.
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Table 1:  Top 5 sophisticated goods and the bottom 5 sophisticated goods (U.S.$2000) 
  Product name   PRODY 2000 
Bottom 5 Vegetable products nes 739.67145 
 
Asses, mules, and hinnies, live 803.94128 
 
Sisal and agave, raw 822.37665 
 
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves, and stems) 866.57587 
 
Hand-made lace, in the piece, in strips or in motifs 901.80627 
   Top 5 Flat-rolled iron or non-alloy steel, coated with aluminium, width > 600mm 50699.391 
 
Sheet piling of iron or steel 46986.039 
 
Sections H iron or non-alloy steel, nfw hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m 46242.609 
 
Tyre cord fabric of viscose rayon 46077.578 
  Cermets and articles thereof, waste or scrap 46058.699 
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  Table 2: Main results 
Dependent variable 
1 
RD 
 
2 
 DD 
Ln (Export Similarity Index)                              
August -0.002** 
 
 
(0.023) 
 August* Year 2005 
 
    0.018** 
  
(0.006) 
   Month fixed effect 
 
X 
Year fixed effect 
 
X 
NOB 4404 8525 
Notes: Standard errors in Column 1 are bootstrapped; standard errors in Column 2 
are clustered at the month level. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
** p<0.05. 
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Table 3: Robustness checks 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
1 
Nigeria DD 
 
 
 
2 
DDD 
 
 
 
3 
Placebo test,  
2003 vs 2002 
 
Ln (Export Similarity Index) 
4 
U.S. exports 
 to China 
 
 
5 
Exclusion of 
processing trade 
 
 
August*Year2005 0.001 0.017                     -0.001    -0.049**  0.014* 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) 
            
Month fixed effect X  X X X 
Year fixed effect X  X X X 
Group-month fixed effect  X    
Group-year fixed effect  X    
Month-year fixed effect  X    
NOB 3972 12497 8262 7015 8435 
Notes: Standard errors in Column 1, 3, 4, 5, are clustered at the month level; standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at country-month level; standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Decomposition of the effect of currency appreciation 
Dependent variable 
1 
   Across firms within a city 
 
 
2 
              Across products within a firm 
 
Ln (Export Similarity Index)             
August* Year 2005       0.015***                               0.002*** 
 
(0.005) (0.001) 
   Month fixed effect X X 
Year fixed effect X X 
City fixed effect X  
Firm fixed effect  X 
NOB 8516 120672 
Notes: Standard are clustered at the month level. Standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
